I understand the points of the article and somehow agree with them.
But I still think that PGP can and should be used in certain scenarios: think of how Snowden interacted initially with Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras.
That particular scenario was about anonimity (I don't want to reveal the sender persona just yet) and temporary "validity" of the messages: if down the line, one or two years later, the message gets decrypted, no harm is done.
Potentially, Snowden could have used a burner phone, install signal and get hold of the journalists phone number - more difficult that email, but not impossible. In Europe it's not so simple to get a sim card in a complete anon way: not impossible, but if one need several sim cards it may get cumbersome and expensive.
Today, you would use SecureDrop[1] for that particular use case (talking to journalists with an established organization). But you're still right for the general case.
But I still think that PGP can and should be used in certain scenarios: think of how Snowden interacted initially with Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras.
That particular scenario was about anonimity (I don't want to reveal the sender persona just yet) and temporary "validity" of the messages: if down the line, one or two years later, the message gets decrypted, no harm is done.
Potentially, Snowden could have used a burner phone, install signal and get hold of the journalists phone number - more difficult that email, but not impossible. In Europe it's not so simple to get a sim card in a complete anon way: not impossible, but if one need several sim cards it may get cumbersome and expensive.