The problem is with the US patent system, not with the patent trolls.
The benefit to society of granting a patent is that it gives companies an incentive to do R&D. The cost to society of granting a patent is that other companies have to pay money to use the same idea. In a healthy patent system, the average benefit of a patent is equal to the average cost of a patent.
If the average benefit is higher than the average cost, the Patent Office should be more lenient in granting patents, or should lengthen the term of the patent. The former solution would increase the number of patents, but the new ones would have lower average benefit. The latter solution would reduce the average cost of a patent. Likewise, if the average benefit is lower than the average cost, the Patent Office should be stricter in granting patents or should shorten the term of the patent.
The average benefit from a software patent is quite low; most software patents are for an obvious solution to an uncommon problem, not for a clever solution to a common problem. The average cost for a software patent is (currently) pretty low too, because patent holders usually don't assert their rights; but if patent holders asserted their rights whenever they could, the average cost would be very high. The solution is for the US Patent Office to be much stricter about assigning software patents.
In a healthy patent system, patent trolls aren't a bad thing. Patent trolls raise the price of patents by buying and using them; that increases the incentives to do R&D. Since in a healthy patent system, the cost to society of the patent troll asserting its patent rights is equal to the benefits from the R&D that gets done, that isn't a problem.
The problem is with the US patent system, not with the patent trolls.
Without addressing any of the other interesting points you raised, I have to rebut this one. I'll start by rewording the sentence to be more accurate by my judgment:
The problem is with the US patent system, and with the patent trolls.
I base my argument on the notion that ethics and morality exist independent of any legal system. Whether what the trolls are doing is legal is irrelevant; they are acting against the interests of society at large and small inventors in particular, under the guise of helping small inventors. Thus, what they are doing is unethical, and they are therefore part of the problem.
The benefit to society of granting a patent is that it gives companies an incentive to do R&D. The cost to society of granting a patent is that other companies have to pay money to use the same idea. In a healthy patent system, the average benefit of a patent is equal to the average cost of a patent.
If the average benefit is higher than the average cost, the Patent Office should be more lenient in granting patents, or should lengthen the term of the patent. The former solution would increase the number of patents, but the new ones would have lower average benefit. The latter solution would reduce the average cost of a patent. Likewise, if the average benefit is lower than the average cost, the Patent Office should be stricter in granting patents or should shorten the term of the patent.
The average benefit from a software patent is quite low; most software patents are for an obvious solution to an uncommon problem, not for a clever solution to a common problem. The average cost for a software patent is (currently) pretty low too, because patent holders usually don't assert their rights; but if patent holders asserted their rights whenever they could, the average cost would be very high. The solution is for the US Patent Office to be much stricter about assigning software patents.
In a healthy patent system, patent trolls aren't a bad thing. Patent trolls raise the price of patents by buying and using them; that increases the incentives to do R&D. Since in a healthy patent system, the cost to society of the patent troll asserting its patent rights is equal to the benefits from the R&D that gets done, that isn't a problem.