I don't think we have much in the way of "behavioural modules" that are instinctively programmed for specific inputs and outputs, in the way a sensible engineer would design it. I doubt that many animals do. It's more likely that we have modules that react to a certain range of inputs, in certain ways, and their combination forms reactions that evolutionary pressure select against. It's neither modular nor hierarchical.
In other words: mess, not modules.
It's clear that animals have instincts, and it would be surprising if we didn't have any. Clearly, we do: for hunger, for sex, for defending territory, for pecking order (dominance hierarchies) but also for language, conscience, law, commerce, cooperation, tool-making and wanting to believe in something greater. These things arise in groups of us without instruction.
But I think two kinds of layers separate us from most other animals, which the article refers to as our flexibility and adaptability. There is conscious adaptability, where you refrain from punching the other fellow on the nose, because of your ethics or fear of consequences or whatever - the reason doesn't matter, the point is that you can modify your response.
And there's the much more important unconscious adaptability (which I think coincides with the physical outer layer in the brain - the cerebral cortex). Conceptually, this acts like an abstraction layer, so that you can treat a tool as an extension of your body; litigation as if it were a physical threat; or users of a computer program as if they formed a tribe. Your interpretation of input is what gives the input meaning - e.g. misunderstandings will affect your reaction. I think this layer can pretty much convert anything into anything; though some instincts, like hunger, can apply pressure towards overriding it (but not control - consider hunger strikers).
I don't claim any special insight here, just restating common sense.
In other words: mess, not modules.
It's clear that animals have instincts, and it would be surprising if we didn't have any. Clearly, we do: for hunger, for sex, for defending territory, for pecking order (dominance hierarchies) but also for language, conscience, law, commerce, cooperation, tool-making and wanting to believe in something greater. These things arise in groups of us without instruction.
But I think two kinds of layers separate us from most other animals, which the article refers to as our flexibility and adaptability. There is conscious adaptability, where you refrain from punching the other fellow on the nose, because of your ethics or fear of consequences or whatever - the reason doesn't matter, the point is that you can modify your response.
And there's the much more important unconscious adaptability (which I think coincides with the physical outer layer in the brain - the cerebral cortex). Conceptually, this acts like an abstraction layer, so that you can treat a tool as an extension of your body; litigation as if it were a physical threat; or users of a computer program as if they formed a tribe. Your interpretation of input is what gives the input meaning - e.g. misunderstandings will affect your reaction. I think this layer can pretty much convert anything into anything; though some instincts, like hunger, can apply pressure towards overriding it (but not control - consider hunger strikers).
I don't claim any special insight here, just restating common sense.